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The theorizing about the doctrine of the Trinity by contemporary analytic philosophers of 
religion  has  recently  been  imbued  with  an  air  of  enthusiastic  excitement  and  self-
confidence.  Some of  them claim to have conclusively solved the mystery (Bohn 2011). 
Others advocate (more modestly) to have worked out new trinitarian analogies silencing 
the objections commonly perceived to challenge the compatibility of monotheism with the 
distinct existence of three personal divine beings (Brower & Rea 2005; Moreland & Craig 
2009; Leftow 2009; Rea 2009). Still others overturn perspectives on the burden of proof and 
charge trinitarian skeptics with being unable to provide sound arguments for the (alleged) 
conceptual flaws of the notion of the Trinity (Senor 2013). As a consequence, according to 
such theorists, traditional worries about identity, distinctness and number in the doctrine 
are due to a shallow understanding of the topic. Once such notions are addressed with an 
in-depth insight, reason suggests to dismiss any trouble.
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My  intuition  is  that,  despite  of  the  euphoria  spreading  from  the  new  trinitarian 
approaches, there’s room for saying something more in support to the embarrassment and 
puzzlement commonly related to the predication of God’s onefoldness and threefoldness. 
Briefly,  trinitarian  enthusiasm  fails  to  see  how  necessarily  having  eternal  personal 
properties definitely conflicts with the possibility to instantiate personally the same divine 
substance. Moreover, since personal properties are traditionally thought of as originated 
by genealogical relations, and genealogical relations are asymmetric relations, one divine 
Person can’t instantiate one and the same being God as another divine Person (e.g., God the 
Father can’t instantiate one and the same being God as God the Son).
My working plan is the following. In the first section I will outline the doctrine of the 
Trinity  as  a  basic  set  of  propositions  (T)  adherents  to  Christianity  are  committed  to. 
Although I  will  rely  on current  construals  of  the logical  problem of  the Trinity,  I  will 
complement such accounts in order to highlights pieces of theological constraints usually 
neglected in the debate. In the second section I will argue for the claim that the RI logic 
developed by P.  van Inwagen (van Inwagen 1995)  is  the best  conceptual  apparatus to 
handle  T.  Notably,  some  scholars  contend  that  RI  logic  doesn’t  help  in  trinitarian 
theorizing (Rea 2005; Tuggy 2003; Vohánka 2013). I will address their claims by showing 
how they miss the point. In light of the acquisitions of this section, the subsequent one will 
be devoted to the main reasons supporting the refutation of latin trinitarianism (LT), social 
trinitarianism (ST) and constitution trinitarianism (CT). In the fourth section, I will finally 
deliver a general argument for (weak) trinitarian skepticism. My view is that the argument 
provides substantive reasons in support to the common sense intuition that either God’s 
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onefoldness  and  threefoldness  aren’t  actually  compatible  or  God’s  onefoldness  and 
threefoldness aren’t robustly construed.
1.
Mainstream Christianity is Nicene Christianity. That is, mainstream christians assent to the 
creedal propositions normatively stated during the fourth century by the First Council of 
Nicea  and the  First  Council  of  Constantinople.  The collections  of  materials  from both 
Councils  open  with  a  declaration  about  the  content  of  christian  faith  by  the  Fathers 
convened in assembly.  Such declarations are called Profession of  Faith of  the  318 Fathers 
(Nicene Creed) and Profession of Faith of the 150 Fathers (Costantinopolitan Creed). During 
the church history both texts have gone under revision. Such revisions include latin and 
armenian  translations  of  the  original  greek  documents  (with  important  theological 
supplements). At present the expression “Nicene Creed” is used as an umbrella word for 
one or the other among the original texts of the Profession of Faith and their revisions. 
However,  in  order  to  refine,  purify,  and modernize  the  original  Creeds,  other  creedal 
statements  appeared too.  Among them, there are the Athanasian Creed (or  Quicumque 
vult), the Apostolic Symbol, and the Symbol of Faith. 
The  creeds  are  normative  texts.  They  establish  in  succinct  statements  what  a  believer 
should assent to in order to be counted as a christian. As such, they are synopses of the 
christian faith.  It  is  then commonly assumed that  creeds  are  the  primal  source  of  the 
doctrine of the Trinity christian believers confess. Notoriously, the creeds mostly overlap 
in  content.  Nonetheless,  there  are  few  but  relevant  differences  among  them.  Such 
differences concern different understandings of the generation and the nature of the Holy 
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Spirit. Consequently, it is not theologically neutral to choose one or the other of these in 
order to assess what the doctrine of the Trinity is meant to be. 
Any version of the creed explicitly asserts that christians worship three Divine Persons, 
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. While it is not obvious from any of the texts (with 
the exception of the Athanasian Creed) that christians assume monotheism, the council 
materials from the Council of Nicea and the Council of Constantinople clarify that the 
existence of a plurality of Divine Beings is to be understood in terms of monotheism. 
The logical problem of the Trinity (LPT) concerns the formal consistency of monotheism, 
the instantiation of the divine nature by the divine Persons, and the actual distinctness of 
the divine Persons. As such LPT does not address each theological issue the creeds give 
voice to: it  simply aims at developing an understanding of the notions of identity and 
distinctness  by  which  identity  and distinctness  claims  about  the  divine  Persons  don’t 
conflict with the basic belief that there is only one God.  It is therefore not necessary to take 
into consideration the different conceptions of the genealogical relations among the divine 
Persons in order to deal with LPT.
Basically, the doctrine of the Trinity is the conjunction of two beliefs: (a) that there is only 
one  God  and  (b)  that  each  of  the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  is  God,  (Council  of 
Constantinople,  “Letter of the Bishops convened in Assembly in Constantinople to Pope 
Damasus and the Western Bishops”). Evidently, taken one at a time, neither (a) nor (b) 
need  special  comments.  On  the  contrary,  their  conjunction  raises  more  than  mere 
perplexity:  it  seems  prima facie  definitely  false.  The  church  fathers  in  Constantinople 
answered such a difficulty by the statement that the Divine Beings are one God, because each 
Person instantiates the same nature, the same power and the same divinity.  Particularly, they 
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have  perfectly  overlapping  divine  properties  (e.g.,  being  one,  being  powerful  and  being 
divine). That is, the divine Persons are identical as to their being God, enumerating how 
many Gods there are being a matter of how many divine natures are instantiated by the 
existence  of  the  divine  Persons.  Personal  distinctness  doesn’t  realize  different  divine 
natures - the church fathers advocated. According to them, personal distinctness in God 
doesn’t affect then the assumption of monotheism.
In light of these considerations, scholars agree (with irrelevant nuances) that “(a) & (b)” is 
to be unpacked as the conjunction of (a) with a number of identity and distinctness claims 
(Cartwright  1987;  van Inwagen 1988;  Rea 2003;  Brower and Rea 2005;  Rea 2009;  Bohn 
2011). By common consensus the following set of propositions (call the set T) is thought to 
express the doctrine of the Trinity:
a) There is only one God;
b) The Father is God;
c) The Son is God;
d) The Holy Spirit is God;
e) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinct.
According to the classical theory of identity, T is formally contradictory. It results that:
1) For any x, y, z and j, if “x=j & y=j & z=j”, then “x=y & y=z & x=z” (from indiscernibility);
2) For any x and y, if x=y, then y=x (from simmetry);
3) God=Father (from (b));
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4) God=Son (from (c));
5) God=Holy Spirit (from (d));
6) The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are identical (from (1)-(5)).
Evidently, being identical entails being not (numerically) distinct. Consequently:
7) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not distinct.
Conclusion follows:
8) T implies “(e) & not (e)”.
The deduction (1)-(8) from (a)-(e) gives formal expression to the common intuition that T 
is  puzzling because three divine beings can’t count as one God. That is,  it  is plain to 
assume that if x and y are F, where F stands for a count noun, and x is distinct from y, then 
x and y are not the same F. But if x and y are not the same F, there are then (at least) two Fs. 
Now, the church fathers in Constantinople claimed that (b), (c), and (d) means that the 
Father,  the  Son,  and the  Holy  Spirit  are  consubstantial,  i.e.,  they  instantiate  the  same 
nature. Therefore, (b), (c), and (d) should be read as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
instantiate the same nature. Nonetheless, they are distinct. Consequently, they can’t be the 
same God; that is, there are three Gods. 
LPT consists in giving an interpretation of T which makes (a) consistent with (b)-(e). There 
are two main ways to understand the task. According to a maximally robust reading of the 
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notions of onefoldness and threefoldness, being onefold (i.e., being a unique individual) 
prevents a thing from being threefold (i.e., being constituted by three individuals). If this is 
the case, being one excludes being three; i.e., God can’t be said to be both one and three 
beings. On the other hand, according to a sufficiently robust reading of the notions, being 
onefold (i.e., being an individual) doesn’t entail being not threefold (i.e., being at a time 
the  source  of  three  different  streams of  phenomenal  features).  Evidently,  a  maximally 
robust reading of the notions of onefoldness and threefoldness rules out any possibility of 
answering LPT. The trinitarian theorist  has then only the weak option at her disposal: 
showing that  a sufficiently robust  reading of  onefoldness and threefoldness suffices to 
make sense of the doctrine of the Trinity (Senor 2013).
Contemporary trinitarian enthusiasm emerges from holding the belief that the one or the 
other  among  the  new  approaches  to  the  Trinity  manages  these  notions  in  such  a 
sufficiently robust way as to dismantle the charge of incoherence. 
Unfortunately,  trinitarian  enthusiasm  seems  groundless.  Recent  works  by  D.Tuggy 
provide interesting reasons in support  of  the claim that  no theory on the marketplace 
accomplishes the task. The problem common to all is that, while they appear able to give 
interpretations of T by which the propositions (a)-(e) don’t imply formal contradictions, 
their rendering of the notions of the identity and distinctness of God, the Father, the Son 
and the Holy Spirit doesn’t capture the data of the revelation. Tuggy outstandingly makes 
the case for the different difficulties LT, ST and CT involve. Particularly, he argues that 
each of these solves LPT in reason of the following unpalatable reading of the relations 
between God (the onefoldness of the divine nature) and the Divine Persons (the threefold 
realization of the divine nature):
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T1) personal distinctness is modal distinctness (Tuggy 2003);
T2) only the Trinity is properly God, God being distinct from any of the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit (Tuggy 2003);
T3)  the  Trinity  is  materially  constituted  by  three  overlapping  (but  not  mutually 
ontologically dependent) Divine Beings (Tuggy 2013).
Considerations against (T1), (T2), and (T3) are ad hoc arguments. They address the peculiar 
features  of  LT,  ST,  and CT,  and establish which unreliable  intuitions each approach is 
construed on. Consequently, they are particularly useful in setting the agenda of trinitarian 
theorizing. That is, trinitarian enthusiasm is reliable if and only if one between LT, ST, and 
CT is able to answer LPT without assuming the disjunction “(T1) ⋁ (T2) ⋁ (T3)”.
Tuggy’s core idea consists in the claim that no sufficiently robust understanding of the 
notions  of  onefoldness  and threefoldness  among the  ones  at  the  theorists’  disposal  is 
suitable to express the data of revelation. My intuition is that a general reason accounts for 
this  fruitful  thesis:  christian  faith  asks  believers  to  assent  to  a  maximally  robust 
understanding of such notions. If this is the case, trinitarian skepticism can be developed 
as  the  claim  that  no  trinitarian  analogy  answers  consistently  LPT  since  the  data  of 
revelation suppose a maximally robust understanding of the notion of onefoldness and 
threefoldness. As a consequence, Tuggy’s refutations of LT, ST, and CT should turn out to 
be particular cases of the general argument for trinitarian skepticism. That is to say, be ATS 
the general argument for trinitarian skepticism. It results that:
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ATS → (not T1) & (not T2) & (not T3))
In order to give a formulation to ATS, I begin with listing some theological requirements 
any answer to LPT should embodied. Meeting such requirements is necessary because 
they determine which notions of identity and distinctness are at work in the doctrine of 
the Trinity.
Firstly, each Divine Person is identical to each others as to the instantiation of a single 
divine nature (IDENTICAL INSTANTIATION OF NATURE). God the Father begets God the Son. 
Creedal formulations explain that begetting here means that the Father transfers the whole 
of his nature to the Son; i.e., God the Son is of one substance with God the Father. While 
there aren’t analogous declarations concerning the genealogical relation of God the Holy 
Spirit  to  God  the  Father  (and  eventually  God  the  Son),  the  church  fathers  in 
Constantinople explicitly claimed that the Holy Spirit possesses the same single divine 
nature  as  the  Father  and  the  Son.  Consequently,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that, 
independently on the way God the Holy Spirit genealogically relates to the source of His 
own divinity, He possesses the divine nature as God the Father and God the Son do.  
Secondly, christian monotheism is the claim that, notwithstanding the existence of three 
divine Persons, the divine nature is an universal actualized just once, because the three 
divine Persons are the same God (SINGULARITY OF DIVINE NATURE).  That  is,  the divine 
nature is a set of properties each of the divine Persons instantiate completely. The history 
of trinitarian theology provides evidence for such a reading of the notion of monotheism 
(Cross 2002; Jacobs 2008).
Thirdly,  according  to  very  traditional  interpretations  of  trinitarian  claims,  the  divine 
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Persons are distinctly discernible just  in terms of their  genealogical  relations (Bottarini 
2006; Emery 2007; Rahner 1967). The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are properly God 
the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit because each of them is simply and fully 
the whole of God. The distinctness of the divine Persons consists then in the fact that the 
actualization by the Father of the whole set of properties the divine nature is ontologically 
relates  to  the identical  actualization by the Son and the Holy Spirit  (the same for  the 
relations between the Son and the other divine Persons and the Holy Spirit and the other 
divine Persons).  If  this is  the case,  the divine Persons have personal properties just  in 
reason  of  the  real  subsistence  of  such  relations.  Consequently,  a  divine  Person  is  the 
instantiation of the divine properties plus the ontological relation of such an instantiation 
to the others (DISTINCTNESS BY GENEALOGICAL RELATIONS). 
Fourthly, the meaning of ontologically relating is being metaphysically dependent on (PERSONAL 
DEPENDENCE).  According to the received view,  if  God exists,  God necessary (eternally) 
exists.  That is,  whatever the divine Persons are, inasmuch as they are God, they enjoy 
necessary both the divine nature and their personal properties. Now, if their possession of 
personal  properties  consists  in  having  a  genealogical  relation  to  the  others,  and  such 
possession is necessary, each divine Person is necessary constituted by His relation to the 
others. That is, the Father can’t be God the Father without the Son being God the Son and 
the Holy Spirit  being God the Holy Spirit  (the same for the Son and the Holy Spirit). 
Consequently, the Trinity of the divine Persons doesn’t relate to God’s agency ad extra: 
there’s no difference in considering the trinitarian relations among the divine Persons in se 
and in the history of salvation. Notoriously, K.Rahner gives a widely accepted formulation 
to  this  claim  by  the  basic  axiom  of  trinitarian  theorizing  (“The  immanent  Trinity  is  the 
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economic Trinity, and viceversa”, Rahner 1967).
Fifthly, all creeds mention that christians worship the Trinity of God. This is the central 
statement of christian faith, and there’s no risk to overestimate its importance. What is 
worth noting here is  that the Father,  the Son, and the Holy Spirit  are clear devotional 
figures believers encounter in their own liturgical experience. That is, christian faith has 
three different focal points. Each of these has proper individuation features and fulfills 
peculiar religious needs. As a consequence it is natural to expect that the Father, the Son 
and the Holy Spirit exhibit evident identifying traits in the believer’s everyday religious 
life.  Creeds attest  such an attitude by plainly individuating strong personal  properties 
each Divine Person enjoys. The Father is the Maker of all things visible and invisible, and 
He is the source of the Godhead. The Son is the Only-begotten of the Father. He takes part 
in the world creating process as the mean the Father makes us of. Further, He incarnates 
for the purpose of the salvation of the human kind, and experiences as a man the birth 
from a poor family, a public religious ministry in Palestine, the death by crucifission, and, 
finally, the resurrection from death. In the latter days He will come again to judge the 
living and the dead. The Holy Spirit proceeds either from the Father or the Father and the 
Son. He is the Lifegiver, and the voice who spoke by the Prophets. He takes also part in the 
Incarnation process, in someway operating the conception of Jesus. He refills (whatever 
refilling could mean) the Apostles in order to inspire them the theological understanding 
of the life and the dead of Jesus; and He leads them to found christian communities all 
over  the  world  by  giving  the  power  to  produce  miracles  and  healings  (LITURGICAL 
BOOSTING OF PERSONAL DISTINCTNESS). 
 !11
2.
With all this in mind, I will now move to show that, under the theological constraints 
driving the interpretation of (a)-(e), RI logic is the most reliable instrument to engage with 
T.
The basic intuition motivating the construal of a logic of relative identity is that identity 
and distinctness  claims are not  absolute but  predicate  relative.  Consider the following 
case. Sir Ian McKellen plays the role of Gandalf in the Lord of the Ring Saga and the role of 
Magneto in the X-Men Saga. According to the classical theory of identity,  this is  to be 
expressed by the following propositions:
1) the actor who plays Gandalf=Ian McKellen;
2) the actor who plays Magneto=Ian McKellen;
3) the actor who plays Gandalf=the actor who plays Magneto.
Proposition (1) attests a referential relation between the actor who plays Gandalf and Ian 
McKellen; proposition (2) between the actor who plays Magneto and Ian McKellen. In 
reason of the identity of the referential relation between the actor who plays Gandalf and 
Ian McKellen in (1) and the actor who plays Magneto and Ian McKellen in (2), the identity 
sign in (3) is thought to be independent on any predicative context. Whatever the actor 
who plays Gandalf enjoys, the actor who plays Magneto enjoys too (e.g., if the actor who 
plays Gandalf is the recipient of six Laurence Olivier Awards then the actor who plays 
Magneto is the recipient of six Laurence Olivier Awards too). 
Relative identity challenges the soundness of such an analysis, because it assumes that 
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sameness  among  referential  relations  is  always  stipulated  in  terms  of  one  predicate. 
Consider again the propositions (1),  (2),  and (3).  They assert  that  the actor who plays 
Gandalf, the actor who plays Magneto, and Ian McKellen are the same man. That is, the 
meaning of the actor who plays Gandalf (Magneto) is identical to Ian McKellen is that the actor 
who plays Gandalf (Magneto) is the same man as Ian McKellen; the meaning of the actor who 
plays Gandalf is identical to the actor who plays Magneto is that the actor who plays Gandalf is the 
same man as the actor who plays Magneto. If this is the case, it results that the identity sign in 
(1), (2), and (3) stands for x is the same man as y. The relative identity theorist asks: what, if 
any,  warrant  that  sameness  in  a  predicative  context  attests  sameness  across  different 
predicative  contexts?  If  the  semantic  interpretation  of  the  identity  sign  in  ordinary 
attributions  of  sameness  and  distinctness  show  that  such  attributions  are  context-
dependent, what reasons justify the assumption that no couple of predicate F and G satisfies 
the proposition “x is the same F as y, but x isn’t the same G as y”?
RI  logic  opposes  the  classical  theory  of  identity  in  considering  what  metaphysical 
consequences could follow from a context-dependent analysis of identity and distinctness 
claims.  Particularly,  against  the assumption that  sameness is  a  transcontextual  relation 
(i.e.,  indiscernibility  in  a  given  context  implies  indiscernibility  in  all  contexts),  the  RI 
logician  claims that  indiscernibility  is  a  matter  of  fact.  Suppose  x  is  the  same F  as  y. 
According to the classical theory of identity, from being the same F, it follows that P(x) 
implies  P(y).  That  is  to  say,  it  is  necessary  to  assume  that  F-ness  dominates  P-ness 
(whatever  is  the  same F  is  the  same P too).  But,  the  RI  logician  demands  reasons  in 
support  to  the  necessity  of  such an assumption:  predicate  dominance is  throughout  a 
matter of fact. Consequently, RI logic is a way to resist the temptation of assuming identity 
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claims on purely metaphysical grounds. 
Van Inwagen’s development of RI logic is a formal language constituted by:
- vocabulary: it  doesn’t include terms for identity, descriptions, demonstratives, names, 
and it contains predicates as x is the same F as y, usual sentential connectives, variables, the 
universal and existential quantifiers, and punctuation marks;
- formation rules;
- rules of inference: the rules of ordinary quantifier logic; Simmetry - for any x and y, if x is 
the same F as y, then y is the same F as x -; Transitivity - for any x, y, and z, if x is the same F 
as y, and y is the same F as z, then x is the same F as z).
This apparatus suffices to engage consistently with T. Consider the predicates is the same 
being  as  and  is  the  same  Person  as.  It  results  that  trinitarian  statements  fall  under  the 
following general interpretation pattern for (a)-(e):
α) There exists a x and x is God. Then, for any y, if y is God, y is the same being as x;
β) There exist a x, a y, and a z, and x is God, y is God, and z is God; but x is not the same 
Person as y, y is not the same Person as z, and x is not the same Person as z. Then, for any 
w, if w is God, w is the same Person as x, or w is the same Person as y, or w is the same 
Person as z;
γ) (β), and for any x and y, if x is God, and y is God, then x is the same being as y.
Evidently, (α)-(γ) doesn’t imply any formal contradiction. Consequently, RI logic allows to 
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give  a  sound  expressions  to  trinitarian  propositions.  Van  Inwagen’s  move  consists  in 
translating proper names as God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit into 
properties each of them enjoys:
God the Father =def x is the Father means that there exists a y, and x begets y and for any z, 
if z begets y, then z is the same Person as x;
God the Son =def x is the Son means that there exists a y, and y begets x and for any z, if y 
begets z, then z is the same Person as x;
God the Holy Spirit =def x is the Holy Spirit means that there exists a y and a z, and x 
proceeds from y (and eventually from z too) and for any w, if w proceeds from y (and 
eventually from z too), then w is the same Person as x.
Propositions (a)-(e) are then expressed as follows:
a’) There exist a x and x is God; then for any y, if y is God, y is the same being as x;
b’) there exist a x and a y, and x is God; then x begets y and for any z, if z begets y, z is the 
same Person as x (F(x));
c’) there exist a x and a y, and x is God; then y begets x and for any z, if y begets z, z is the 
same Person as x (S(x));
d’) there exist a x, a y, and a z, and x is God; then x proceeds from y (and eventually from z 
too) and for any w, if w proceeds from y (and eventually from z too), w is the same Person 
as x (H(x));
e’) there exist a x, a y and a z, and x is God, y is God, z is God; then F(x) is not the same 
 !15
Person as S(y) or H(z), G(y) is not the same Person as F(x) or H(z), H(z) is not the same 
Person as F(x) or S(y).
My claim is that RI logic is the most appropriate instrument to handle T. Indeed, classical 
trinitarian theorizing is a vigorous attempt to highlight the fact that the predicate being the 
same God as is not dominant on the predicate being the same divine Person as. In order to 
argue for my claim I will address two different tasks. Firstly, critics charge van Inwagen’s 
RI logic with being unintelligible (Tuggy 2003, Rea 2005), false (Tuggy 2003) and unhelpful 
to make the point for the logical possibility of T (Vohánka 2013). I will then shortly defend 
RI logic. Secondly, I will show that the only way to do justice of the theological constraints 
listed at the end of the previous section is to deal with them in a RI logical setting.
As to  the  first  task,  M.Rea contends that  the  account  of  T  by van Inwagen’s  RI  logic 
supplies a solution to LPT just in case it is able to supplement the logical treatment of (a)-
(e) with a clear story about how identity can be predicate relative. That is, RI logic gives an 
intelligible answer to LPT if and only if it can cast light on the way being the same God as 
doesn’t  dominate being the  same Person as.  Unless  such a story is  available,  RI  logic  is 
simply a formal statement of trinitarian claims. Now, van Inwagen doesn’t provide the 
trinitarian theorist with the required supplemental story. Conclusion follows: RI logic is to 
be dismissed as a solution to LPT. Particularly, in the absence of such a supplemental story, 
while RI logic succeeds to manage the data of revelation in a way that prevents T from 
generating formal  contradictions,  RI  logic  has  a  hard price  to  pay:  distinctness  claims 
could turn out to be numerical distinctness claims. If this is the case, RI logic solves LPT by 
assuming a veiled form of tritheism (which isn’t obviously an orthodox way of facing the 
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trinitarian doctrine).
In my view the issue here is to identify what the data of revelation ask the christian to 
believe, and what requirements should be met in order to count a logical formulation of 
trinitarian statements as a solution to LPT. Suppose for a while that RI logic accommodates 
soundly  the  data  of  revelation,  and consider  what  a  solution  to  LPT should  be.  In  a 
relevant respect, a solution to a problem is a complete explanation of it. As a consequence, 
strictly speaking, it is evident that RI logic doesn’t solve LPT, because it doesn’t say how it 
is possible that the predicate being the same God as doesn’t dominate the predicate being the 
same Person as.  It  seems an uncontroversial  principle of classical western ontology that 
different instantiations of the same nature involve numerical distinctness. Common sense 
shares such belief. And classical theism assumes that God is a Person (Swinburne 2004). 
Accordingly, being the same God as should no doubt dominate being the same Person as. But 
the question is: does all this matter to the evaluation of the RI logic’s application to LPT? 
The answer is plainly negative. Van Inwagen explicitly asserts that what a system of RI 
logic for trinitarian theorizing should aim at isn’t explaining the metaphysical possibility 
of the existence of one God in three Persons; rather, it should simply look for a sound 
formulation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  by  which  T  doesn’t  generate  formal 
contradictions. Rea grants that van Inwagen’s RI logic accomplishes such a task. Therefore, 
it  appears  irrelevant  whether  the  formulation  is  supplemented  with  a  metaphysical 
explanation concerning predicative dominance. And once the predicative dominance of 
being  the  same  God  as  over  being  the  same  Person  as  is  rejected,  tritheism  is  justifiably 
dismissed.
Evidently, the opponent of RI logic can argue along the following lines. Right! You give a 
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formally consistent interpretation of T. But even if your proposal works from a logical viewpoint, it 
is unintelligible. It lacks any experiential grip. It isn’t possible, in fact, to understand how relative 
identity could be true (Tuggy 2003). Therefore, it is nothing more than a refined restatement of 
trinitarian claims. It is abstruse, redundant, and definitely question begging. All true, I say. But I 
ask: should the trinitarian theorizing provide solutions to LPT? That is,  does engaging 
consistently with T involve that LPT should be definitely answered?
An ecumenical commonplace of trinitarian theology is the assumption that the doctrine of 
the Trinity is a mystery. Could christian believers fully understand the mystery? Evidently, 
no. Should they? Again, no. The contemplation of God is the culmination of the christian 
hope for the afterlife. The Trinity of God won’t be a mystery for all those partaking in the 
joys  of  heaven.  Unfortunately,  due  to  this-worldly  condition,  no  human  being  in  the 
present state of affairs can attain a complete conceptual enjoyment of the trinitarian nature 
of God. And no human being ever had: neither the Apostles, the disciples, and the other 
individuals having had face to face experiences of Jesus. Such evidence notwithstanding, 
christians are asked to confess their faith in the full divinity, full identity to God and full 
personal distinctness of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. It is a consequence of the 
fact that the Trinity is a mystery that what trinitarian theorizing can achieve at best is a 
statement  of  the  doctrine  handling  consistently  the  data  of  revelation.  Does  such  an 
enterprise suffice in order to assent to the Trinity? Evidently, yes. I assent to Kepler’s Laws. 
I understand what their contents mean, because I’m able to apply them for solving easy 
exercises  contained  in  my  old  handbook  of  physics.  Nonetheless,  I  have  no  intuition 
helping me to exactly clarify how it is that Kepler’s Laws are true. I can’t imagine the 
actual size of astronomical bodies, the actual distance among them, and, more importantly, 
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the relationship among them. My imaginative experiences are strongly approximate here, 
and,  supposedly,  doesn’t  provide  a  well  established  model  for  planetary  motions.  I 
learned, however,  that Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation accounts for the reason 
why planets move. But I can’t really conceptually enjoy what gravitation is. I can see its 
effects, I can’t see gravitation. I can feel its effects (I feel resistance when I climb the stairs), 
but I can’t feel gravitation. Further, I know that it is possible to describe these effects by 
measuring quantities involved in planetary motions. And I can use these measures for the 
purpose of  calculation.  But  I  can’t  grasp gravitation itself.  Consequently,  I  can’t  really 
conceptually enjoy all that Kepler’s Laws actually claim. Does the assent to Kepler’s Law 
parallel the assent to the Trinity? To an important extent, yes. Both Kepler’s Laws and the 
doctrine of the Trinity are (allegedly) consistent settlement of acquired data. Both Kepler’s 
Laws and the doctrine of the Trinity aren’t objects of full conceptual intuitions. What’s 
needed in order to assent them then? Minimal rationality, i.e. consistency and accuracy in 
settling data. Does the RI logic treatment of trinitarian data is consistent (I will address 
accuracy shortly)? Yes, it is. The opponents grant this too. Conclusions follows: it is not 
necessary to  supplement  the RI  logic’s  application to  trinitarian theorizing.  If  RI  logic 
accurately accommodates the data of revelation and captures how traditional trinitarian 
theorizing addressed and gave formulation to the doctrine to the Trinity, than RI logic is an 
instrument to reason into the mystery, i.e., to state the doctrine consistently. 
Further criticisms come from V.Vohánka. As Rea, he concedes that the expression of the 
doctrine of the Trinity in RI logic is a consistent one. Differently from Rea and Tuggy, he 
concedes  even  more:  Van  Inwagen’s  treatment  of  T  doesn’t  necessary  require  a 
supplemental  story,  because  logical  possibility  doesn’t  involve  strong  intelligibility. 
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However, Vohánka claims, consistent formulation in RI logic doesn’t imply that they are 
logically  possible.  Impossible  propositions  as  something  is  and  isn’t  red  are  formally 
consistent in sentential logic. Nonetheless, they appear logically impossible. Consequently, 
RI logic should strive for something more than mere formal consistency: it should prove 
that the doctrine of the Trinity is also logically possible. 
Vohánka  understands  logically  possible  as  not  entailing  any  explicitly  self-contradictory 
proposition, a proposition being explicitly self-contradictory when it states that something 
is and isn’t so and so, or that something is and isn’t such and such, or that something is 
and isn’t in such and such relation, or that something does and doesn’t exist. According to 
this understanding, van Inwagen development of RI logic doesn’t provide any reason for 
the logical possibility of the doctrine of the Trinity, because formal consistency in RI logic 
or standard logic doesn’t imply logical possibility, whereas sharing a form with something 
logically  possible  in  RI  logic  doesn’t  warrant  that  (at  least)  some among the semantic 
interpretations of the form aren’t logically self-contradictory. As regards to this, Vohánka 
observes that a typical case of self-contradictory interpretations of valid forms in RI logic 
concerns the treatment of the instantiation of specific and generic properties. Evidently, it 
is logically impossible that some things are of the same species but of different genus. 
Now,  being  the  same  species  as  and  being  the  same  genus  as  are  two  relative  identity 
predicates. As for T, they can be used to handle in a formally consistent way propositions 
as x is the same species of y, but is not the same genus of y.  As a consequence, the formal 
consistency of T doesn’t exclude that T is not logically self contradictory.
Now, Vohánka’s counterexample hits the target. In reason of α, β, and γ, (a’)-(e’) can be 
given a formal translation in such a way that the form involved is shared by both logically 
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possible and impossible contents. I ask notwithstanding: isn’t the doctrine of the Trinity an 
unique and unparalleled case? Isn’t RI logic’s application to LPT an use sui generis? Van 
Inwagen states very clearly that he believes RI logic to be useful only inside theology. It 
doesn’t  seem compelling then to  refute  RI  logic’s  application to  LPT in  reason of  the 
alleged falsity of general RI logic (Tuggy 2003). Even if RI logic were definitely rejected for 
application to ordinary contents, it could turn out to be the case that its application to the 
logically consistent formulation of the Trinity works. There’s an evident reason for this 
claim. While the notion of logical possibility in terms of not entailing anything explicitly 
self-contradictory (probably) matters to all earthly things, it is not sure that transcendent 
objects (as God is thought to be) necessary fall  under the rule of the one or the other 
among the standard developments of logic. I’m not claiming that dealing with the notion 
of God supposes the use of some exotic logic opposing the notion of logical possibility 
assumed by standard logic. Rather, I hold simply that it seems uncontroversial that what 
pertains to  the notion of  God could not  parallel  what  pertains to  earthly things,  pace 
Leibnizians. Consequently, I’m not sure that the logical possibility of T should be evaluate 
unintelligible in reason of the logical impossibility of propositions sharing its very same 
form in RI logic.
After all, Vohánka just proves that a set of propositions, translated consistently in RI logic 
by the same form used to translate trinitarian claims, is evidently logically impossible. No 
doubt, it doesn’t follow from this that the translation of T is logically impossible too. And 
the  theological  and  non-theological  views  driving  the  semantic  interpretation  of  the 
relevant form in RI logic suggest that the case of T doesn’t actually parallel the case of 
specific and generic properties.
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The  RI  logic’s  application  to  LPT  then  leads  theorists  to  the  starting  point  of  the 
development  of  RI  logic.  Which  reasons  attest  that  identity  is  transcontextual?  Which 
reasons demonstrate that the predicate being the same God as dominates the predicate being 
the same Person as? The RI logician will answer: it is sure that no logical reason succeeds in 
pursuing the task. All considered, this is a matter of fact throughout. There’s an important 
outcome here: RI logic isn’t an explanatory program for T. On the contrary, it is a way to 
engage with T without assuming that T generates formal contradictions. How making (a’)-
(e’)  logically  possible  then  depends  only  on  the  way  the  Trinity  of  God  actually  is. 
Conclusion follows: it can be granted that van Inwagen’s RI logic doesn’t show that T is 
logically possible. Nonetheless, Vohánka’s claim appears irrelevant: sharing the same form 
in  RI  logic  with  logical  impossible  contents  doesn’t  prove  that  the  translation  of  T  is 
logically impossible either.
Consequently, the core problem with RI logic’s application to LPT should consist simply in 
evaluating how accurately RI logic accommodates the data of revelation. I will now move 
to such a topic. Consider the five theological constraints of IDENTICAL INSTANTIATION OF 
NATURE,  SINGULARITY  OF  DIVINE  NATURE,  DISTINCTNESS  BY  GENEALOGICAL  RELATIONS, 
PERSONAL DEPENDENCE, and LITURGICAL BOOSTING OF PERSONAL DISTINCTNESS. 
The  first  and  second  constraints  specify  the  way  being  God  is  to  be  understood.  By 
IDENTICAL INSTANTIATION OF NATURE christians are asked to believe that there’s just one 
actualization of divine properties. Evidently, being God means instantiating divine properties. 
Suppose divine properties  are  being eternal,  being necessary,  being omnipotent,  being 
omniscient, and the like. Then, christians should hold that there’s just one way of enjoying 
eternity,  necessity,  omnipotence,  omniscience,  and  the  like.  By  SINGULARITY  OF  DIVINE 
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NATURE christians assent to a more peculiar belief.  Divine nature is an universal (i.e.  a 
collection of properties) necessary realized by one single being: whoever actualizes divine 
nature enjoys identically the whole collection of divine properties and nothing more. 
Evidently,  the  conjunction  of  the  first  and  second  constraints  implies  that  God’s 
onefoldness is understood in a maximally robust way. That is, according the data of the 
revelation, the predicate being God  (being the same God as) is dominant on the predicate 
instantiating  divine  properties  (being  the  same  instantiation  of  divine  properties  as),  because 
given that  x  and y are God,  if  x  instantiates  one among the divine properties,  then y 
instantiates it too. Van Inwagen’s RI logic expresses such a maximal robust reading of the 
two constraints by the assumption of (α). 
The fourth and fifth constraints specify how being a Person  should be meant to be.  By 
PERSONAL DEPENDENCE christian should believe that Persons are constituted by mutual 
relationships.  This  claim is  to  be read in a  very strong sense.  Each of  us is  obviously 
constituted by our relationship to our relatives, our friends, and all relevant persons we 
encounter in our life. But no one of us is constituted by relations to others as strongly as 
divine Persons are, because while we are used to think ourselves to be contingent, divine 
Persons’ existence is evidently necessary. That is, some of the persons I’m acquainted with 
may have never seen any of  my children.  Naturally,  they know me,  i.e.,  they know a 
person who does most of what he ordinary does in reason of the fact that he is what he is 
because he has a family so and so. Nonetheless,  in some important respect,  they have 
knowledge of me as ontologically independent on any person I’m actually related to. On 
the  contrary,  the  divine  Persons  don’t  enjoy  an  analogous  ontological  independence. 
Seeing the Father is seeing the Son and the Holy Spirit too. To an important respect, their 
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relationship forms an indissoluble knot. However, such a knot is a connection among three 
clearly  distinct  beings.  By  LITURGICAL  BOOSTING  OF  PERSONAL  DISTINCTNESS  christians 
reveal a very precise awareness of personal distinctness. The agency of the divine Persons 
show individual actualizations of divine properties. Each of them plays a different role in 
the history of salvation, does different things, and experiences different states of affairs. 
The  conjunction  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  constraints  makes  sense  just  in  terms  of  a 
maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God. That is, it seems that christians are 
committed  to  worship  three  inter-twinned  but  numerically  distinct  divine  beings. 
Consequently, according to the data of revelation, the predicate being a divine Person (being 
the same Person as) dominates the predicate instantiating personal properties (being the same 
instantiation of divine properties) because given that x and y are the same divine Person, if x 
instantiates one among the personal properties, then y instantiates it too. Van Inwagen’s RI 
logic assumes such a maximal robust reading of the two constraints by the assumption of 
(β). 
What is the dominance relation between being God and being a divine Person? Evidently, the 
data of revelation ask christians to believe that the former doesn’t  dominate the latter, 
however difficult such a task could be. According to the first, second, fourth, and fifth 
constraints the notion of God entails indeed that both God’s onefoldness and threefoldness 
are to be read in a maximally robust sense. Onefoldness: all which is divine is identical. 
Threefoldness: all which is personal is distinct. Now, the doctrine of the Trinity is the claim 
that there are three divine Persons. That is, all which is personal means all which is personally 
divine. Consequently, the doctrine of the Trinity consists in the claim that the divine nature 
is the realm of identity, but, at least for a case, i.e. the personal actualization of the divine 
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nature, the actualization of identity allows for personal but not divine distinctness. There’s 
no easy escape from the demanding cave of trinitarian theorizing. 
Now, the third constraint specifies how being a Person relates to being God. By DISTINCTNESS 
BY GENEALOGICAL RELATIONS christians should believe that Persons differ only for the way 
their possession of the same divine nature relates to others. The Father, the Son, and the 
Holy  Spirit  aren’t  distinct  in  reason of  either  their  nature  or  the  instantiation of  their 
nature.  Rather,  they  are  distinct  because  of  the  relationship  among  them.  The  Father 
possesses the divine nature causa sui; the Son receives the divine nature from the Father; 
the Holy Spirit takes the divine nature from the Father (and eventually the Son). Therefore, 
according to the third constraint,  each of  them instantiates  identically  the same single 
nature (first and second constraints),  but having such an instantiation a relationship to 
others, each of them is distinct and enjoys peculiarly the same stream of divine properties 
(fourth and fifth constrains). Van Inwagen’s RI logic expresses the assumption of the third 
constraint by (γ). 
The  source  of  the  conflict  among  trinitarian  claims  stands  here.  DISTINCTNESS  BY 
GENEALOGICAL RELATIONS assumes that a maximally robust reading of the uniqueness of 
both the divine nature and its instantiations can’t be formally consistent with a maximally 
robust reading of the threefold personality of God unless christians are able to disentangle 
the way the divine nature is realized (being God) from the way the realizations of the divine 
nature  relates  among them (being  a  Person).  Any other  compatibilist  reading  of  God’s 
onefoldness and threefoldness clashes among different pieces of evidence. 
Suppose personal distinctness relies on the different forms of agency the divine Persons 
are told to exercise by the creedal statements. Then the notion of onefoldness couldn’t be 
 !25
read robustly, since (at least) the IDENTICAL INSTANTIATION OF NATURE is rejected. That is, x 
and y are two divine Persons. Accordingly, they instantiate identically the same single 
nature. Among the divine properties there’s omnipotence. In reason of the dominance of 
being God over instantiating divine properties, whenever x and y exercise an agency, x and y 
should  exercise  the  same  agency.  Nonetheless,  the  starting  supposition  assumes  that 
personal distinctness relies on the evidence of distinct qua individually different agencies 
by the divine Persons.  Therefore,  distinct  agencies  shouldn’t  be dismissed.  Conclusion 
follows: the divine Persons doesn’t instantiate identically omnipotence. On the contrary, 
suppose the uniqueness of both the divine nature and its instantiation is seriously taken. 
Consider x and y being two divine Persons. Since being a person dominates instantiating 
personal  properties,  both  of  them  instantiate  a  peculiar  personal  properties.  Evidently, 
personal properties are divine personal properties for God. Consequently, because of the 
domination of being God  over instantiating divine properties,  if x and y are God, x and y 
instantiate  identically  divine properties.  Personal  properties  should then be identically 
instantiated too. The conclusion is that personal distinctness vanishes. What attains to a 
Persons attains identically to all, and there’s just a single Person here: God.
In light of these considerations the third constraint results to be the decisive reason in 
support of the RI logic’s approach to LPT. The identity in the instantiation of a single 
nature definitely conflicts with strong personal distinctness because if divine Persons are 
to  be  distinguished in  terms of  their  relationships,  and such relations  are  asymmetric 
relations, then the divine Persons can’t instantiate the same nature. Consider the begetting 
relation subsisting between the Father and the Son. Begetting is asymmetrical. If someone 
begets some other, than the other is not begetting, but begotten. According to the fourth 
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constraint  the Father’s  begetting the Son is  a necessary relation.  According to the first 
constraint any divine being instantiates identically the same properties. Now, according to 
the second and third constraints being the Father means instantiating the divine properties plus 
begetting the Son; being the Son means instantiating the divine properties plus being begotten by 
the Father. Consequently, in reason of the necessary possession of contrary properties by 
the  divine  Persons,  christians  should  be  able  to  say  at  a  time  that  being  the  Father  is 
definitely different from being the Son, that the Father is God and the Son is God, and that 
there  is  only  one  God.  The  third  constraint  suggests  a  way  to  perform the  task,  i.e., 
resisting the temptation of considering the divine Persons like mere tokens of the type 
divine beings. Indeed, there’s just one divine being, that is God. God instantiates the whole 
set of divine properties, and has a threefold relation to such an instantiation (begetting, 
being begotten, proceeding). This threefold instantiation is necessary. More interestingly, 
having a threefold relation to the instantiation of the divine nature it allows God someway 
to exist as three divine Persons. How it is possible no one knows. What exactly means, no 
one knows. It’s a mystery - christian theologians advocate. Anyway, He is each divine 
Persons. That is, the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Consequently, 
whoever  instantiates  the  unique  divine  nature,  instantiates  it  identically.  Nonetheless, 
God’s threefold relation to His nature ontologically constitute Him as a Trinity of divine 
Persons.  Since each of them is strongly distinct from the others,  each of them actually 
exercises a different agency in the history of salvation, experiences a peculiar stream of 
awareness, and has individual features. 
The key move here is to hold that the intension of the predicate being God doesn’t overlap 
completely with the intension of the predicate being a Person. That is, such predicates point 
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at partially different things. The third constraint asserts exactly that if a Person is said to be 
God, what the proposition expresses is that there is an instantiation of divine properties; 
differently, if a divine Person is said to be a Person, what the proposition expresses is that 
there is a peculiar relation among the instantiations of the divine properties.
Now,  there’s  an  evident  way to  embody the  deep core  of  these  considerations  into  a 
formally consistent statement of the Trinity, i.e., assuming that being God doesn’t dominate 
being  a  divine  Persons.  No  intuition  helps  here.  Common  sense  raises  doubt  indeed. 
Trinitarianism asks christians to understand being God and being a Person as intensionally 
differing and (at  least  in part)  extensionally overlapping. But such a reading is  a very 
innatural one. Maximally robust understandings of God’s threefoldness evidently suppose 
to  read  prima  facie  the  predicates  in  terms  of  intensional  overlapping  and extensional 
difference.
Is this enough to reject the Trinity? I’m not sure: human logical skills appear to be suitable 
to this-worldly affairs. What is certain is that christians should confess the doctrine of the 
Trinity.  The doctrine  requires  to  understand God’s  onefoldness  and threefoldness  in  a 
maximally robust way. Although RI logic can’t provide clear intuitions accounting how it 
is  possible  that  being  God  doesn’t  dominate  being  a  Person,  it  complies  with  such  a 
requirement comfortably, i.e. in a formally consistent way. Therefore, it can be the case that 
no  christian  results  able  to  make  intuitively  compatible  her  understanding  of  the 
onefoldness of God with His threefoldness. But it seems the only right way to travel, any 




General arguments against LT, ST and CV follow from the assumption of the treatment of 
LPT by RI logic. I  will  now briefly state what the lines of argumentation are. LT is an 
explanatory project for the notion of the Trinity. Its starting point is the uniqueness of the 
divine nature. The proposal consists in accounting for the threefoldness of God in reason 
of the uniqueness of His nature. On the contrary, ST moves from the threefold personality 
of God to the uniqueness of His nature (Tuggy 2003; Moreland & Craig 2009; Leftow 2010; 
Bohn 2011). CT is the view that three distinct divine Persons share the same substratum by 
accidental sameness. Shortly, each Person is a unity of matter and form. Divine properties 
constitute matter. Form is the principle of personal individuation. The three divine Persons 
identically actualize the same nature by personally informing the onefold divinity (Rea 
2009; Tuggy 2013). Finally, E.D.Bohn proposes a solution to LPT which doesn’t fit into any 
of  the preceding categories.  He claims that  identity is  a  one-many/many-one relation. 
Consequently, God’s uniqueness and tripersonality are to be accounted for by the way the 
same substance is regarded. That is, God’s reality can be conceptually divided into two 
different  ways:  considered as a  whole it’s  simply God;  considered as a  multiplicity of 
Persons it’s a Trinity (Bohn 2011).
My  general  claim  is  that  neither  of  these  solutions  to  LPT  works  because  of  the 
impossibility to give a maximally robust reading of the onefoldness and threefoldness of 
God outside the speculative province of RI logic. 
Tuggy distinguishes two versions of LT, the popular and the refined (Tuggy 2003). The 
former  is  committed  to  the  assumption  of  (T1),  i.e.,  personal  distinctness  is  modal 
distinctness. The latter (among which Tuggy unsoundly positions RI logic too) is refuted in 
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reason of ad hoc  considerations.  B.Leftow is the proponent of  the most notable refined 
version of LT (Leftow 2009). My claim is that Leftow’s refined LT collapses into popular LT 
because Leftow’s main assumption is that God is one Person acting concurrently three 
different roles in the history of salvation. True: Leftow’s approach allows attributing to the 
divine Persons three different streams of consciousness as personal distinctness entails. 
But such three different streams of consciousness are distinct just from the viewpoint of 
human beings.  In  God they are  three  simultaneous flows of  actions  produced by one 
single personal agency. Consequently, each of the divine Persons is a different mode of 
consciousness of the same divine Person, i.e. the only God. Conclusion follows: Leftow’s 
LT assumes (T1).
Now, the general argument against LT runs as follows:
1)  In  order  to  be  evaluated  a  sound  theory,  any  theory  handling  T  should  meet  the 
conjunction  of  the  five  theological  constraints  over  trinitarian  theorizing  (from 
hypothesis);
2)  The  fourth  and  fifth  theological  constraints  over  trinitarian  theorizing  entails  a 
maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God (from hypothesis); 
3) Each version of LT assumes (T1);
4) (T1) isn’t a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God;
5) LT doesn’t assume a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God (for (3) and 
(4));
6)  LT  doesn’t  meet  at  least  one  requirement  by  the  five  theological  constraints  over 
trinitarian theorizing (from (2) and (5));
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7) LT isn’t a sound theory handling T (from (1) and (6)).
Surprisingly enough, ST turns out to be unsound for the very same reason than LT. Since 
ST’s  starting  point  is  the  threefold  distinctness  of  the  divine  Persons,  it  would  be 
reasonable  to  expect  that  ST fails  to  meet  the  first  and second theological  constraints. 
Nonetheless, as Tuggy proves, it is an immediate consequence of ST’s approach to LPT 
that only the Trinity is properly God, God being actually the community of the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit. Consequently, if the Trinity alone is God, personal distinctness 
doesn’t permit to state that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are God. It is then 
evident that (T2) can’t do justice to a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God. 
It results that:
1)  In  order  to  be  evaluated  a  sound  theory,  any  theory  handling  T  should  meet  the 
conjunction  of  the  five  theological  constraints  over  trinitarian  theorizing  (from 
hypothesis);
2)  The  fourth  and  fifth  theological  constraints  over  trinitarian  theorizing  entails  a 
maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God (from hypothesis); 
3) Each version of ST assumes (T2);
4) (T2) isn’t a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God;
5) ST doesn’t assume a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God (for (3) and 
(4));
6)  ST  doesn’t  meet  at  least  one  requirement  by  the  five  theological  constraints  over 
trinitarian theorizing (from (2) and (5));
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7) ST isn’t a sound theory handling T (from (1) and (6)).
As  for  LT  and  ST,  also  CT  can  give  a  consistent  solution  to  LPT  just  setting  aside 
maximally robust reading of God’s threefoldness. Indeed, (T3) infringes directly upon the 
fourth constraint (CT assumes that the divine Persons aren’t strongly dependent on each 
others) and the fifth constraint (CT assumes that the divine Persons are exactly identical 
inasmuch as they stand in a relation of accidental sameness without identity). Particularly, 
accidental sameness involves complete overlapping. Distinctness appears only if one of 
the materially composed beings sharing the same substratum ceases to impose its form on 
matter. That is, distinct beings enjoying accidental sameness are commonly discernible in 
terms  of  their  different  conditions  of  permanence.  Conclusion  follows:  as  long  as  the 
divine Persons share the same substratum, i.e.,  they are one God,  they aren’t  actually 
distinct.  On the contrary,  suppose they are  strongly discernible  (as  the fifth constraint 
requires). Then, they are no more in the relationship of accidental sameness.
Therefore:
1)  In  order  to  be  evaluated  a  sound  theory,  any  theory  handling  T  should  meet  the 
conjunction  of  the  five  theological  constraints  over  trinitarian  theorizing  (from 
hypothesis);
2)  The  fourth  and  fifth  theological  constraints  over  trinitarian  theorizing  entails  a 
maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God (from hypothesis); 
3) Each version of CT assumes (T3);
4) (T3) isn’t a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God;
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5) CT doesn’t assume a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God (for (3) and 
(4));
6)  CT  doesn’t  meet  at  least  one  requirement  by  the  five  theological  constraints  over 
trinitarian theorizing (from (2) and (5));
7) CT isn’t a sound theory handling T (from (1) and (6)).
I  now come to  the  last  option  for  trinitarian  theorizing  (Bohn 2011).  Bohn’s  proposal 
depends on the claim that identity is a one-many/many-one relation. Naturally such a 
claim is strongly controversial, but I don’t intend to move criticism to the metaphysical 
point here; because, even if identity were as Bohn assumes it be, the application of the one-
many/many-one notion of identity to LPT would remain unpalatable. 
What’s  wrong  is  again  the  impossibility  to  accomodate  the  requirements  by  the  fifth 
constraint. Evidently, concepts cut reality. As a consequence, the use of concepts renders 
reality according to different conceptual views. Bohn states with a dose of common sense 
that  it  is  a  matter  of  fact  how much adequately  concepts  cut  reality.  While  diverging 
concepts could apply to the same reality, just appropriate concepts express soundly the 
state  of  affairs  they  extend  on.  The  divine  reality  is  differently  cut  by  the  notions  of 
onefoldness and threefoldness.  But,  since the data of  revelation attest  us that  they are 
adequate to God’s reality, then it is to be assumed that God is a Trinity of Persons. Bohn 
claims: suppose to regard God’s reality in terms of onefoldness. God will appear as one 
being. On the contrary, suppose to regard God’s reality in terms of threefoldness. God will 
now appear as three Persons. 
The basic point in Bohn’s solution is that the identity with God of the Father, the Son, and the 
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Holy Spirit is to be understood collectively and not distributively  (B). Such a claim prevents 
from attributing  distinct  divinity  to  each  of  the  Persons.  That  is,  according  to  Bohn's 
solution each of the Persons isn’t really God if regarded distinctly from the other. There’s 
just  a  way  then  to  make  (B)  theologically  acceptable:  to  assume that  the  Persons  are 
discernible, but actually not distinct. Consequently, (B) implies that the fifth constraint is to 
be dismissed.
The general argument against Bohn’s view (BT) is then the following:
1)  In  order  to  be  evaluated  a  sound  theory,  any  theory  handling  T  should  meet  the 
conjunction  of  the  five  theological  constraints  over  trinitarian  theorizing  (from 
hypothesis);
2)  The  fourth  and  fifth  theological  constraints  over  trinitarian  theorizing  entails  a 
maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God (from hypothesis); 
3) Each version of BT assumes (B);
4) (B) isn’t a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God;
5) BT doesn’t assume a maximally robust reading of the threefoldness of God (for (3) and 
(4));
6)  BT  doesn’t  meet  at  least  one  requirement  by  the  five  theological  constraints  over 
trinitarian theorizing (from (2) and (5));
7) BT isn’t a sound theory handling T (from (1) and (6)).
4.
Trinitarian skepticism is the claim that, while the notion of the Trinity can be expressed in 
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a formally consistent way, human understanding is unable to grasp completely what the 
Trinity actually is. There are two possibilities of construing trinitarian skepticism. Weak 
trinitarian skepticism is the claim that human understanding is unable to grasp completely 
what  the Trinity  actually  is  because  of  God’s  transcendence.  That  is,  the fact  that  human 
beings haven’t the capability to fully understand God in this-worldly condition is due to a 
lack of cognitive, sensorial, and experiential skills suitable to enjoy Him. Consequently, 
from the assumption of weak trinitarian skepticism it follows that God can be a Trinity, 
and that human beings are perfectly entitled to worship the Trinity of God. The alternative 
construal  of  trinitarian  skepticism,  the  strong  one,  infers  metaphysical  facts  from 
epistemological  evidence.  It  is  the claim that,  since human understanding is  unable to 
grasp completely what the Trinity actually, God can’t be a Trinity. 
In my view, strong trinitarian skepticism is definitely irrational and I’m not willing to 
subscribe it (although in the past I felt sympathetic to such a position). On the contrary, 
what  RI  logic’s  application to  LPT inclines  to  it  is  the  assumption of  weak trinitarian 
skepticism (I believe van Inwagen won’t be at ease with the claim that his development of 
RI logic constitutes evidence in support of a form of moderate skepticism). 
Indeed, ATS is to be spelled out as follows:
1) According to maximally robust reading of the notion of onefoldness and threefoldness, 
either a thing is onefold or threefold (from hypothesis);
2) The five theological constraints over trinitarian theorizing entails a maximally robust 
reading of both the onefoldness and threefoldness of God (from hypothesis);
3) Maximally robust onefoldness and maximally robust threefoldness aren’t compatible in 
 !35
the claim that God is one being in three Persons (from (1) and (2));
4) Human understanding is unable to grasp completely what the Trinity actually is (from 
(3)).
Now:
1)  A theory  soundly  handling  T  expresses  (a)-(e)  accordingly  to  a  maximally  robust 
reading  of  both  the  onefoldness  and  threefoldness  of  God  (from  the  five  theological 
constraints); 
2) RI logic soundly handles T (from hypothesis);
3)  RI  logic  expresses  (a)-(e)  accordingly  to  a  maximally  robust  reading  of  both  the 
onefoldness and threefoldness of God (from (1) and (2));
4) RI logic expresses (a)-(e) by disentangling maximally robust God’s onefoldness from 
maximally robust God’s threefoldness (from hypothesis);
5)  According  to  RI  logic’s  application  to  LPT,  maximally  robust  onefoldness  and 
maximally robust threefoldness aren’t compatible in the claim that God is one being in 
three Persons (from (3) and (4)).
There’s an uncontroversial moral in all this story. RI logic provides a formally consistent 
account for the notion of the Trinity. Such account suffices for worshipping one single God 
and  three  divine  Persons  to  the  higher  justifiable  degree  at  disposal  to  human 
understanding. What lacks here to achieve better results is not cognitive in nature. It is 
experiential. The problem isn’t indeed handling consistently T. Rather, it is grasping how it 
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is  possible to be the case that  a  state of  affairs  reveals  the compatibility of  maximally 
robust onefoldness with maximally robust threefoldness. 
Maybe, the apostle Paul pointed at such a problem when he claimed that human beings 
are in need of a spiritual nature in order to be commensurate with God: “So it is with the 
resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable. It is 
sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is 
sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body” (1 Cor 15.42-15.44).  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